a proposal to curtail Supreme Court jurisdiction to review cases involving contempt of Congress, as well as cases involving state and federal regulation of subversive activities. 8 After Reynolds v. Sims 9 a bill which passed the House of Representatives would have withdrawn jurisdiction from the Supreme Court and the district courts to hear cases in which plaintiffs sought to force reapportionment of state legislatures. 10 From 1953 to 1969 over 60 unsuccessful bills were introduced in Congress to curtail some aspect of federal jurisdiction." Today, because of a number of district court decisions ordering the busing of schoolchildren to overcome segregation, 12 the issue of congressional dominion over federal court jurisdiction is again of vital national importance.' 3 During the current controversy there have been two approaches to the subject of Congress' control of federal jurisdiction. The position taken most often in contemporary debate begins with the assumption that Congress has authority to abolish the lower federal courts.
14 Since Congress has the power to abolish, this argument runs, Congress must have plenary control over inferior federal jurisdiction.'5 Others have begun with the same assumption but feel that a resolution of the subsequent questions is not so easily achieved. Must Congress, they ask, to satisfy Article III, vest jurisdiction in some federal court to hear all cases within the federal judicial power?', What are the limits on congressional control of Supreme Court jurisdiction?' 7 If Congress can remove an entire class of cases from the district court level, can Congress also limit the remedies available to a court once it is given jurisdiction to hear a case?' s Virtually all of those who have engaged in this contemporary debate, however, assume that Congress may abolish the lower federal courts. 19 That such an important assumption should be unquestioned in the current furor over busing is surprising. Clearly it limits the range of argument open to those favoring broad mandatory federal jurisdiction. If the assumption is false, inquiry should be redirected to whether Congress may selectively withdraw jurisdiction to grant to his place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student. H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) Vol. 83: 498, 1974 a particular remedy from district courts and to whether it may withdraw a particular case or class of cases from those tribunals. 20 This article will attempt to demonstrate that the premise that Congress may abolish the lower federal courts is false. Such courts may in the beginning have been a luxury for the young nation. Today they are almost as necessary as the Supreme Court in performing the functions given the federal judiciary in the Constitution. "The life of a nation"' has come to depend in no small degree on these bodies and their too hastily assumed mortality should be a matter of general concern. If it is true, as I argue, that inferior federal courts may not be abolished, then resolution of the corollary questions of whether Congress can selectively curtail jurisdiction or resort to certain remedies is more difficult.
I. May Congress Abolish the Lower Federal Courts?

A. The Traditionat View
Article III of the Constitution is the starting point for analysis of this question: Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish ... Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
The foregoing text is open to several interpretations with regard to Congress' power over lower tribunals. It states that the judicial 20 . The primary focus of this article is on the power of Congress to abolish, curtail the jurisdiction of, or remove remedies from, the lower federal courts. There is a very closely related question as to the authority of Congress to restrict the jurisdiction of both the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court under the jurisdictional power and the exceptions clause of Article III. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. For a discussion of the aspects of this question that I will not address see Blumstein, The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction-Reform Proposals, Discretionary Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 VAND. L. REv. 895 (1973) . 21 . A. BICKEL, THE LF-,sr DANGEROUS BRANCH 14 (1962) (writing about judicial review).
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court "and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The quoted phrase can be interpreted to mean that Congress may establish lower federal courts on a discretionary basis. An equally rational reading of Article III leads to a contrary conclusion. Section 2 gives the federal judiciary power to hear in the first instance many cases which are not within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. 22 Thus, there is a gap between the full reach of federal judicial power and that which is conferred originally by the Constitution on the Supreme Court. This gap, when read in conjunction with the "shall" of § 1, suggests that there must be inferior courts to exercise the residuum of federal jurisdiction withheld from the Supreme Court. This proposition is supported as well by the fact that § 2 originally read "the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" and was changed to read "The judicial Power. ' 23 It thus seems clear that lower courts were intended to be covered.
An interpretation of Article III much like the second one set forth above was advocated long ago. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee - 24 Justice Story concluded from the phrase "shall be vested" that the whole federal jurisdictional power must be vested in some federal court. Since Article III gave federal courts jurisdiction wherever the Supreme Court lacked original jurisdiction, it followed that congress [was] bound to create some inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original cognizance. Justice Story later repeated this position 2 and, in a modified form, it has found some support. 2 Justice Story's dicta might have carried the day but for the argu-22. "In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. A constitutional challenge to a federal statute, for instance, would be within the ambit of the federal judicial power but not within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
23. Ratner, supra note 15, at 164. James Madison and Gouvernor Morris recommended this change and it was accepted by the entire Convention without any debate. 28 This decision seems to have been a compromise between those who favored mandatory inferior federal courts and those who believed that state courts could and should perform the trial functions.
MNI. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
2 0 Thus while Congress was given authority to create new courts, it was not compelled to do so. 3°T he Hart and Wechsler argument has for a long time preempted serious debate on the significance of the ambiguities in Article III. Recently, however, Professor Goebel has argued that the words "ordain and establish" in Article III, 3 1 when viewed in light of their meaning in 1787, demonstrate that the Convention intended that lower federal courts should be created. As originally submitted to the Committee of Style, the draft had read:
The Judicial Power of the United States both in law and equity shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.
32
Goebel guesses that the change from the original submission to the current language reflected a victory for the "four stalwart nationalists" on the Committee. 33 Goebel summarizes:
That the Committee [of Style] intended to convey the sense of an imperative is apparent from the choice of the most forceful words in the contemporary constitutional vocabulary-"ordain and establish"-to direct what Congress was to do. 34 28. BATOR, supra note 11, at 11-12. The proposal for inferior tribunals was contained in Randolph's Virginia Plan. I FAnRxND, supra note 23, at 21-22. It was initially passed by the Committee of the Whole on June 4, 1787. Id. at 95. The next day, however, John Rutledge moved for and obtained reconsideration of the provision. After reconsideration the Committee voted to give the national legislature discretion to establish lower courts, 2 FARRAND 125, a position later adopted by the Convention. But see 1 J. GOEBEL Professor Goebel's interpretation of the words in their 1787 context suggests another approach to the question whether lower federal courts must exist, one that emphasizes the context in which Article III was written. If this approach fails the Hart-Wechsler view must prevail, for, based solely on the debates at the Constitutional Convention, their position seems to have the edge over those of Justice Story and Professor Goebel. Viewing the compromise in context, however, it is doubtful that the lower federal courts are dispensable.
B. A New Thesis
The traditional position on abolition of the lower federal courts relies exclusively on an interpretation of one discrete compromise at the Convention. It thus ignores other constitutional realities that suggest that the lower federal courts cannot be abolished. If that argument is to have contemporary validity, it must come to terms with circumstances affecting the framers' decision and their view of the national judiciary's functions. If, because of changing circumstances, the framers' aspirations for the national judiciary cannot be fulfilled today without lower federal courts, 3 5 then there is a conflict between the Hart and Wechsler view of the decision to leave creation of lower courts to Congress' whim and the constitutional definition of the judiciary's role. Ignoring the compromise emphasized by Hart and Wechsler would involve abandonment of a formulation not central to the constitutional scheme. The existence of lower federal courts since the first Congress suggests that the terms of the compromise are not essential to the constitutional plan. On the other hand a decision to limit the legitimate role of the national judiciary would weaken one branch of government, perhaps fatally. The critical functions performed by the lower courts 6 suggest their continued vitality may be, in Learned Hand's phrase, "essential to prevent the defeat of the venture at hand . . 37 35 (1934) . These cases support the propriety, perhaps even the necessity, of reinterpreting early constitutional formulations in light of changed circumstances. See also note 51 infra. Even so fervent an advocate of judicial restraint as Professor Phillip Kurland has recognized that changed conditions may require broadening the federal judiciary's constitutional role. In the context of the executive branch's expansion in modern times and the threat posed by such enlargement to our constitutional system, he states, " [T] he Court would remain true to its function of preserving the original meaning of the Constitution if it were to act more aggressively to help prevent the executive from overreaching his constitutionally limited function." P. The national judiciary was intended to perform a number of roles. Perhaps the most central is its power to check the other two branches of government. 38 The Supreme Court inhibits attempts by the other branches to overstep constitutionally mandated boundaries of authority. Two other functions of the national judiciary are closely related. First, it is the judiciary's task to achieve uniformity of decision on questions of national concern. 3 9 Second, a national judiciary helps ensure that federal interests take precedence over those of any particular state in matters of federal competence. The framers' interest in institutionalizing these two functions is best illustrated by the colonies' judicial endeavors during the Revolutionary War.
During the war the colonies commissioned vessels to harass British shipping. General Washington sought guidance from the Continental Congress regarding the disposition of booty acquired in successful harassments, 4 0 suggesting that courts be established to handle disbursement of the prizes. 41 The Continental Congress resolved 42 that state courts should handle prizes and provided an appeal to the Congress from state court determinations. At first, review was by congressional committee, but in 1781 Congress established the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture. 43 This court and its predecessor, the congressional committee, were necessary because some overexuberant privateers had seized ships belonging to neutrals 44 and state courts were not always sympathetic to neutrals' claims. 4 5 Since the Continental Congress was seeking the assistance of neutrals, it created a national tribunal to prevent state authorities from hindering that effort. This example of protecting the united interest over that of a particular state 46 and of a mechanism to assure some degree of National courts were also to provide a forum in which foreigners, out-of-state litigants, 47 and the new government itself might get a fair hearing. 4 8 The lawyers at the Constitutional Convention were well aware of the local biases of state courts. 49 Finally, the new government would need a judiciary of its own to ensure proper implementation of its laws. 50 The list of functions could be extended, an exercise not necessary for present purposes. 51 There was, however, at least one other vital function: The national judiciary was intended, perhaps above all else, to be able to hear and do justice in all cases within its jurisdiction. In the 1780's, not unlike today, "[c]ourts were thought of in part . . . as instruments for the protection of individuals. Two of the most influential delegates to the Constitutional Convention stressed the federal judiciary's role as a protector of citizens. At the Convention itself Gouverneur Morris stated that everyone had witnessed "excesses against personal liberty, private property and personal safety." 5 3 In one of the Federalist Papers Hamilton emphasized that the courts must protect individuals from legislative tyranny:
Limitations on legislative authority can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. Vol. 83: 498, 1974 The state ratification debates also indicate that it was commonly assumed that the federal judiciary would vindicate private rights within the federal jurisdiction.5 The diversity jurisdiction in the Constitution was designed to give litigants a chance to obtain an impartial tribunal. 50 There was no suggestion that the national judiciary or Congress had the power to choose which of the rights set forth in the text of the Constitution would be vindicated. At the Virginia deliberations on the proposed constitution, Supreme Court jurisdiction was said to be intended "to prevent injustice by correcting the erroneous decisions of local subordinate tribunals . . ., 57 This can only mean to do justice in each individual case which falls under the federal jurisdiction, even if by appellate review. 58 This emphasis on the national judiciary's role as vindicator of private and individual rights strongly suggests that the framers intended that national tribunals would hear each case within the federal judicial power. Hamilton is again instructive:
The evident aim of the plan of the convention is, that all the causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons receive their original or final determination in the courts of the Union. There can be little doubt that the early Supreme Court did in fact supply a final determination of those cases appealed to it, no matter how trivial the matter might appear from a national perspective. 0°T he judiciary would also be unable to check legislative abuses if its jurisdiction were limitable at the discretion of Congress."i To assume that the framers desired both to control the legislature by means of the federal courts and to give the legislature a method for nullifying such control by a simple majority vote approving a jurisdictional statute is "to charge them with chasing their tails around a stump. A compelling indication that the framers intended the federal judiciary to be capable of affording a forum for all cases within its jurisdiction comes from an omission from Article III. Neither the final arrangement nor any of the five judiciary plans submitted to the Convention gave federal courts authority to decline to hear a case. 63 Discretionary review by the Supreme Court did not originate until 1925. 6 4 The framers' failure to confer, or even consider conferring, discretionary review powers upon courts suggests that federal tribunals, including the Supreme Court, were thought capable of providing a forum in all cases within their jurisdiction. 5 One is tempted to ask how the framers could both intend the federal judiciary to be capable of hearing all cases within its jurisdiction and at the same time not explicitly incorporate inferior federal courts into the constitutional scheme. The answer is that the founding fathers felt that the right to appellate review by the Supreme Court would be sufficient to ensure that all litigants with cases within the federal constitutional jurisdiction would have their cases heard by a national tribunal. 0 0 This faith in the availability of Supreme Court review was in evidence at the Constitutional Convention. 0 7 Rutledge employed it as a rationale for not including any lower federal courts in the constitutional scheme. 1 a major factor in the acquiescence of some in the deletion of mandatory inferior tribunals at the Convention. Others expressed a similar sentiment by noting that they expected few federal cases. If there were to be only a few cases, it is clear that the Supreme Court, by appellate review, would have been capable of exercising the "judicial power of the United States" effectively. Roger Sherman, a delegate to the Convention from Connecticut, later wrote that "it is not probable that more than one citizen to a thousand will even have a cause that can come before a federal court." 70 Alexander Hanson, a Maryland federalist, also felt that there would be few federal actions. 71 Soon after the Convention, James Madison wrote to George Washington, "The great mass of suits in every State lie between Citizen & Citizen, and relate to matters not of federal cognizance." 72 With but few exceptions 73 the framers felt that the federal judiciary, due to the constitutional limits on the subject matter of its jurisdiction, would peacefully coexist with state courts, handling only those few cases of federal concern.
74 Thus commentary at the time of the passage of the Constitution suggests that underlying the exercise of the other functions of the federal judiciary was the notion that the federal courts, whatever their form, could be expected to hear any litigant whose case was within the federal constitutional jurisdiction, either at trial or on appeal. This view is buttressed by the lack of any provision in the Constitution giving the federal courts discretionary jurisdiction. The federal forum may have been limited to appellate review, but it was to be available in all cases.
The framers' apparent willingness to limit the federal role to an appellate role in the form of Supreme Court review was perfectly understandable at the time. Without question, the Supreme Court 70. Sherman, A Citizen of New Haven, I (essay originally published on Dec. 25, 1788, in the New Haven Gazette), reprinted in ESSAYS, supra note 30, at 241.
71. As the rod of Aaron once swallowed up the rods of the Egyptian inagi, so also is it feared, that these federal courts, will, at length, swallow up the state tribunals. A miracle, in one case, is as necessary, as in the other. But let not the officers of state courts be overmuch alarmedl The causes, which, by possibility, may be instituted in the federal courts bear no comparison to the rest. Hanson, supra note 48, reprinted in PAMPHLETS, supra note 30, at 239 (footnote omitted).
72. Since the Court's jurisdiction was not discretionary, ;7 any litigant whose case fell within the federal judicial power and who was determined to have a federal forum hear his case could have had such a forum even in the absence of lower federal courts.
Since the early days of the republic, however, the number of federal cases has increased dramatically. During the 1972 term alone the Supreme Court wrote full opinions in 164 cases, 7 8 while disposing of 3,748 cases. 70 This increase in case load has had significant consequences for both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. The Supreme Court is clearly no longer capable of providing a federal forum to hear the merits of every case involving a federal question." 0 If Congress were to abolish the lower federal courts, this aspect of the national judiciary's role would fall upon the Supreme Court in the form of review of state court decisions. The inevitable result would be that few litigants with federal claims could be heard in a federal court even on appeal. 8 ' The burden of Article III, as understood by the framers, would fall upon one court-the Supreme Court.
As the federal caseload has grown the role of lower federal courts has undergone change. Today the lower federal courts are more than mere federal trial forums for cases falling within the Article III jurisdictional grant. First, in those instances where the Supreme Court makes a pronouncement of nation-wide impact regarding federal rights or interests, the lower courts are needed to enforce and apply it. Moreover, as Supreme Court review becomes more selective, the lower courts have become the primary vindicators of federal rights. In the noncriminal area, the reapportionment and desegregation decisions have generated hundreds of lower court cases. 8 6 If the burden of enforcing such important decisions and resolving all the subsidiary questions were left to the Supreme Court, it is doubtful that the task could be performed. Judge Carl McGowan has noted the increased latitude available to the Supreme Court in desegregation cases simply because the lower federal courts are there for enforcement and implementation functions:
The promulgation of those principles [announced in Brown v. Board of Education] would have provided an infinitely more daunting prospect in the absence of the machinery provided by the inferior federal courts. Their performance in the discharge of this difficult task has been less than even, but is it conceivable that the job could have been entrusted entirely to the state courts, bearing in mind the differences in loyalties and the vulnerability to local pressures inherent in an elective system of judges? The federal judges themselves have, even with the security provided them by the Constitution, found the going hard.
82.
As one might guess, there is no discussion of this eventuality by the framers, for they at least publicly claimed that the number of cases within the federal judicial power would be few. Hamilton, however, was of the view that the lower federal courts were to be the first line of defense in protecting the liberties and rights secured to individuals by the Constitution:
We have seen, that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be confined to two classes of causes, and those of a nature rarely to occur. In all other cases of federal cognizance, the original jurisdiction would appertain to the in- Similarly, the success of innovative Supreme Court action in other areas, such as reapportionment and criminal procedure, has rested in substantial part upon the support of the lower federal courts.
8 9
The lower federal courts are even more important where the Supreme Court chooses to remain silent. To a significant extent the contemporary guarantors of federal rights are not the nine Supreme Court Justices but the judges of the district courts and courts of appeals. 90 The lower judges are not authorized to decline to hear a federal matter within their jurisdiction. This shift in the Supreme Court's function has meant that it must decline to hear most cases. The modern Court has no qualms about refusing to decide a case or controversy even when it has jurisdiction to do so. It may prefer to hear a case in which a particular issue is presented in a "clean-cut" manner, 99 on a more complete record, 1 0 0 or simply under "more appropriate circumstances."' 0 1 Whatever one thinks of such techniques, they illustrate the modern Court's understanding of its function.
It is thus no longer reasonable to assert that Congress may simply abolish the lower federal courts. When Supreme Court review of all cases within Article III jurisdiction was possible, lower federal courts were perhaps unnecessary. As federal caseloads grew, however, lower federal courts became necessary components of the national judiciary if the constitutional duty of case by case consideration of all federal cases was to be fulfilled. It can now be asserted that their existence in some form is constitutionally required. The Supreme Court performs two overlapping roles in American political life. The first is to maintain and enunciate a political-legal order through formal adjudication. The second is to preserve the social-political bonds of the nation. The conclusion that lower federal courts must exist, though of singular importance, really marks the beginning of a more serious inquiry into the scope of mandatory federal court jurisdiction. While Congress does not have unfettered control over lower court jurisdiction such that it could in effect abolish the courts by obliterating their jurisdiction, it is also clear that some degree of congressional control, consistent with the Constitution, is valid.
C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF
Just as the text of Article III is inconclusive in determining whether Congress may abolish lower federal courts in 1973,103 it also provides little guidance with respect to the scope of congressional authority over inferior federal court jurisdiction. Article III states that the judicial power shall extend to enumerated classes of cases. While this might be taken to imply the Congress must give some federal court or courts jurisdiction in all cases outlined in Article III, it is not clear whether vesting discretionary jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to hear all federal cases would saiisfy such a requirement.
Article III's silence on the scope of congressional control over the lower federal courts does not mean there is no guidance on the matter. The considerations that underlie the conclusion reached in Part I have jurisdictional implications as well: The federal forums mandated by them must be invested with jurisdiction to hear federal issues. Other constitutional provisions and the manner in which they interact with jurisdictional statutes provide further guidance.
A. Congressional Power to Restrict Jurisdiction to Avoid Case Overloads and Promote Efficiency
It is tempting to conclude that Congress must give the lower courts power to hear all cases within the federal judiciary's constitutionally defined jurisdiction. Under such a theory failure by the Federal Ju- The Supreme Court was a vehicle for implementing the accepted policy of having a national judiciary. Whatever Professor Hart based his argument upon-the cornerstone appears to be a separation of powers theory-it is implausible that the Constitution allows Congress to destroy the essence of that which the Court represents, the national judiciary. Professor Hart's thesis therefore suggests that Congress cannot destroy an essential role of the national judiciary. The conclusion on which the foregoing is based, however, is a faulty one. The availability of a federal lower court forum for each case should be sacrificed only when providing such a forum would seriously undermine the judicial system. An overabundance of federal forums with unrestricted jurisdiction to hear all federal cases could in fact undermine the judiciary. A number of factors suggest the necessity for linedrawing. First, the expense of such a system might make it impracticable. 07 Second, a large increase in the caseload would inevitably mean an increase in the number of judges and a decrease in the prestige attached to being a federal judge. Many commentators, including Judge Friendly, have stated that such prestige is needed if the federal bench is to continue to attract qualified lawyers, especially in areas where private practice is more lucrative.os "Any deterioration in the quality of the district judges individually or of their performance collectively would destroy the very values the fedeial court system is meant to attain. Thus, it would appear that Congress has some Article III authority to limit federal jurisdiction. The authority to curtail, however, is limited by its origins. It cannot be used to restrict jurisdiction over busing, reapportionment, or any other narrowly defined class of cases that pose little threat to efficiency; such selective curtailments would bear no rational relationship to the end sought, namely preservation of the quality of federal justice. The power to curtail is limited to prudent steps which help avoid case overloads.
In practice, the current jurisdictional scheme satisfies the above principles remarkably well. Congress has provided a federal forum for federal questions." 112. See note 106 supra. By the brief treatment of this class of cases, I do not mean to suggest that they are easily recognizable or explainable. See generally BATOR 850-90.
There is another class of diversity cases in which the full range of constitutional jurisdiction is not vested. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), the diversity statute, has been construed to require full diversity in cases involving multiple defendants. 2A MOORL The restrictions in all three classes of cases have additional characteristics which make them acceptable devices for limiting federal jurisdiction. The $10,000 jurisdictional requirement is, in an important sense, a neutral scheme of jurisdictional withdrawal. It would not seem to prevent the lower federal system from hearing any particular federal issue and thus avoids the possibility of substantive lawmaking by jurisdictional manipulation.l1a There is a difference in kind between limiting the amount in controversy without regard to subject matter and foreclosing jurisdiction to hear, for example, desegregation actions. The latter has the immediate effect of relegating consideration of a particular federal question to state courts and the remote possibility of Supreme Court review. Thus lack of jurisdiction with respect to some federal question cases cannot justify limiting federal jurisdiction with respect to particular issues.
Federal question and diversity cases involving less than $10,000 and lurking federal question cases arguably involve less vital federal interests as classes of cases than do other potential areas for jurisdiction restriction. 1 " The third class, involving as it does cases in which a federal question may be lurking but does not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, should be restricted for the same reasons that the abstention doctrine is permissibly employed. That is to say, until the federal question has become clear the federal courts can avoid what is essentially a matter within the responsibility of the state courts.
There is a similar ground on which the failure to extend district court jurisdiction in another class of cases can be justified. In state supra note 60, at 109, for, although federal forums must be available to vindicate federal rights, those rights that are of federal or constitutional cognizance may of course change over time. Modern federal habeas doctrine makes federal forums available for state prisoners' constitutional claims.
114. As to the potentially enormous number of cases in the "lurking" federal question class of cases, see Mishkin, supra note 106, at 162. criminal proceedings it is often not clear at the outset whether a federal question will be involved. Sometimes a federal question does not become apparent until the defense has coalesced and even then it may be difficult to determine whether the "federal" matter will determine the outcome. Unless it does even the Supreme Court could not overturn a conviction." 7 To require original federal jurisdiction in all these cases would be extremely wasteful. The state courts here perform a useful sifting function by narrowing the class of cases that require federal review to those that in fact turn upon federal issues.
Thus the $10,000 jurisdictional amount limit in federal question and diversity cases, which was enacted to relieve the burden on the federal courts,"1 8 is a constitutional exercise of congressional authority. Similarly, congressional refusal to extend federal question jurisdiction to all cases in which the Constitution might authorize it can be viewed as preserving the federal courts' essential role by not extending their reach to a ruinous number of cases. The salient features of these current restrictions are neutrality, efficiency, and some weighing of interests. They provide useful guidelines for Congress' exercise of its power to protect the courts. For instance, the legitimate end of efficiency may be served by a limiting statute without undue sacrifice of what should be the dominant theme in the jurisdictional structure-federal court availability. Nevertheless, adherence to any one goal does not ensure that a given jurisdictional restriction will be proper. There is a limit to how far Congress can go in the name of efficiency. A provision precluding federal court jurisdiction in all federal question cases would have a dramatic impact on caseloads, but the cost in terms of availability would be too great. Nor will "neutrality" always guarantee propriety. A statute excluding every second case filed in district court would, of course, reduce caseloads and achieve total neutrality-every issue would eventually be heard in federal court. Its failure to assess the importance of the interests involved, however, would render it so arbitrary as surely to be unconstitutional.
B. Congressional Power to Curtail Jurisdiction Because of Substantive Disagreement With Judicial Decisions
The jurisdictional limitations thus far considered are different from those mentioned at the outset of this article. The proposed statutes 118. See BATOR, supra note 11, at 39-40.
restricting jurisdiction over reapportionment, desegregation, and busing cases have little in common with the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement. They were inspired by something other than regard for judicial efficiency. As these examples suggest, in practice it has not been difficult to distinguish legislation motivated by efficiency considerations from political reaction." 19 Sponsors could not seriously emphasize the beneficial effect of busing curbs on overcrowded dockets. Such proposals are frank attempts to alter or neutralize substantive federal decisions, 120 motives which on one occasion arguably led the Court to strike down a jurisdictional statute.' 2 1 These proposed statutes focus directly on a controversial area. Because of their narrow scope the considerations that warrant permitting Congress broad 119 . In an earlier confrontation between branches of government, the Senate Judiciary Committee chastized President Roosevelt for attempting to "pack" the Supreme Court under the guise of adding judges to increase court efficiency. S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937).
120. Sponsors have not masked their intentions. Consider Senator Jenner's remarks on why he introduced legislation to restrict the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in subversive activity cases, supra note 8:
It was introduced because I had become gravely concerned by what appeared to be the self-evident fact that we had a runaway Supreme Court to deal with.
[T]here had been a long line of cases, involving Communists and subversive activity, in which the Court had accepted, point after point, the legal propositions advanced by the Communists, until we arrived at a point where it seemed to me Congressional action was inescapably required. If a statute denying jurisdiction in a certain class of cases can be shown to be the product of a desire by a majority of those voting for it to deny citizens the protection of a certain constitutional right, the court should insist upon a defense of the choice in terms which rationally relate the choice to an acceptable goal and are unrelated to the inhibition of the right in issue. It would be impossible to infer such a forbidden motivation from the setting of a jurisdictional amount applicable to all sorts of cases. An inference of unconstitutional motivation might, moreover, on rare occasion be rebutted by a showing that some adequate alternative means of ensuring protection of the right exists, and Congress knew of it. But where the inference of intent to curtail the enforcement of a constitutionally guaranteed right is solid, and no alternative legitimate justification suggests itself -and one seldom would-the Court should invalidate the statute, "jurisdictional" though it may be. Id. at 1308-09 (footnotes omitted).
123. It is possible to imagine a law that falls neatly into both categories. A single statute might deal with many different categories of cases. No such jurisdictional provision has been found. Another is a statute dealing with federal habeas corpus cases for state prisoners, a class of cases with some substantive unity but large enough to have a substantial impact on lower court caseloads. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 37, at 18.
As mentioned before, § 702(a) of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets bill, S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), would have terminated federal habeas corpus for state prisoners:
The judgment of a court of a State upon a plea or verdict of guilty in a criminal action shall be conclusive with respect to all questions of law or fact which were determined, or which could have been determined, in that action until such judgment is reversed, vacated, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to review by appeal or certiorari such judgment; and neither the Supreme Court nor any inferior court ordained and established by Congress under article III of the Constitution of the United States shall have jurisdiction to reverse, vacate, or modify any such judgment of a State court except upon appeal from, or writ of certiorari granted to review, a determination made with respect to such judgment upon review thereof by the highest court of that State having jurisdiction to review such judgment. This Section was eliminated by the Senate. 114 CoNG. REc. 14171-84 (1968) .
Such a provision must be analyzed not only in terms of Congress' jurisdictional power, but also in relation to Article I, § 9, of the Constitution, which prohibits suspension of the writ of habeas corpus except in emergencies. See Eisenstrager v. dealing with such statutes is to consider jurisdictional statutes on a continuous spectrum. At one end are clear efforts to promote efficiency and avoid case overloads. Such statutes should be judged largely by the factors already discussed. At the other end are blatant efforts to alter or reduce the impact of judicial results. The considerations underlying a presumption of validity at the efficiency end are of greatly decreased relevance at what may be called the spectrum's substantive end. At this substantive end the presumption that there must be forums for federal issues would weigh strongly against restrictive jurisdictional statutes.
With this last presumption favoring federal forums as a guiding principle, one may ascertain the scope of Congress' substantive jurisdictional power by employing traditional statutory analysis. In passing on the validity of a federal statute one must determine its natural or probable effect and measure that effect against constitutional requirements. If a statute fails to conform to those requirements it must fall. The foregoing principles apply, of course, to jurisdictional statutes, 124 but because jurisdictional statutes seem to have a less direct substantive impact than other statutes, some preliminary analysis of the effects of jurisdictional statutes is in order.
The impact of a statute depriving both federal and state courts of jurisdiction to hear a claim is obvious and drastic. Statutes that foreclose only lower federal court jurisdiction have more subtle 125 but no less serious substantive effects. Consider a statute that deprives lower federal courts, but not state courts, of jurisdiction to hear a narrowly defined class of cases. Such a provision cannot be Furthermore, in cases in which state courts uphold the validity of federal statutes, appeal to the Supreme Court is not as of right.' 2 Even if the Court were physically capable of handling all of these cases, there could be no guarantee to the parties that their federal claims would ever be heard in a federal forum. Cases in which appeal is supposedly as of right do not necessarily receive consideration on the merits. The Court's practice of dismissing for want of a substantial federal question 129 makes its control over its appellate docket similar to its control over its certiorari docket.' 3 0 Although the two classes of cases may not receive identical treatment, 13 1 it is certainly true that no particular litigant with a "right" of appeal to the Court has any assurance that the Court will hear the merits of his case.' 32 Thus exercise by Congress of broad jurisdictional power based on the existence of state courts is not consistent with the Article III role of the national judiciary.
It is not enough to say that state courts might perform well or that the Supreme Court might grant certiorari or that the lower federal courts might not be up to the task of protecting federal rights. These results may all occur with some frequency. The crux of the argument is independent of state court performance. The job is given by Article III to the national judiciary. The framers undoubtedly realized that in some cases state courts could suffice, but they chose to rely on independent and tenured federal judges for the vindication of federal rights. 133. In 1789 Oliver Ellsworth noted possible difficulties in relying on state courts for the protection of federal claims. "To annex to State Courts jurisdictions which they had not before, as of admiralty cases, and, perhaps, of offences against the United States, would be constituting the judges of them, pro tanto, federal judges, and of course they would continue such during good behavior, and on fixed salaries, which in many cases would illy comport with their present tenure of office." Letter from Ellsworth to Judge Richard Law, dated August 4, 1789, quoted in V. BROWN Vol. 83: 498, 1974 cannot review each case. In the case of an individual whose federal claim is rejected by state courts and who, because the Court is unable to hear all cases, fails to gain Supreme Court review, the effect of a federal jurisdictional withdrawal may be indistinguishable from that of a substantive statute foreclosing his claim. Technical niceties, of course, could be employed to distinguish the two kinds of laws. Jurisdictional statutes are theoretically unrelated to primary behavior; they impose no direct duties or penalties. The fact that a law appears in the jurisdictional section of the United States Code, however, does not mean that it lacks substantive impact. Thus, where constitutional rights are rendered nugatory by state courts, 34 the effect of a federal jurisdictional limitation on an individual denied Supreme Court review is strikingly close to a substantive law limitation. 13 5 Indeed, this effect is the very reason for congressional attempts to curtail jurisdiction. 13 0 Any substantive statute with such deleterious effects on the enforcement of federal rights would be struck down.1 37 Jurisdictional statutes should receive similar scrutiny. They too are subject to constitutional limitations; 38 if they have such unconstitutional substantive effects, they are themselves unconstitutional.
The proposition that Congress may not accomplish by jurisdictional manipulation that which it could not otherwise accomplish was endorsed in two decisions rendered after Congress had foreclosed state and federal jurisdiction to hear the particular claims involved. In Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 3 9 plaintiffs sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 140 seeking compensation for time spent cleaning up after their work days. The Act provides for compensation at time and a half the normal wage for that part of a work week in excess of 40 hours. The Supreme Court had previously held that the term "work week" in the Act included the periods of time for which plaintiffs sought compensation .
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Congress, fearing drastic unexpected liability for employers as a result of the Supreme Court decisions, 1 ' 2 enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,'43 which in effect overruled the Supreme Court's interpretation of "work week" and deprived federal and state courts of jurisdiction to enforce the unanticipated liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act.' 4 4 Plaintiffs claimed that the Portal-to-Portal Act, which was made retroactive, violated the Fifth Amendment's due process clause by destroying rights recognized previously by the Supreme Court. The Battaglia court rejected the substantive claim on the merits 4 5 but did not feel that the outcome was governed by the jurisdictional removal. If plaintiffs' substantive claim had been upheld, the jurisdictional limitation would not have prevented the court from reaching the merits . Emergency Court of Appeals, created by the Act, the decisions of which could be reviewed by the Supreme Court on petition for writ of certiorari.' 0 ' Under provisions of the Act a district court convicted Yakus of violating price regulations, rejecting his defense based on their alleged invalidity. In affirming the conviction, 5 2 the Supreme Court held that there was no right to injunctive relief under the circumstances because the procedure for protest and review in the Emergency Court of Appeals "affords to those affected a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence."' 153 The Court emphasized the adequacy of the separate procedure' 54 and intimated that, in the absence of an adequate substitute, the statute under review might be vulnerable. ' Additional support for subjecting jurisdictional statutes to constitutional scrutiny comes from United States v. Klein. 15 In discussing the facts in Yakus the Court noted that penal consequences could flow from departures from the rate schedule set by the Interstate Commerce Commission and that the defendant in the criminal proceeding could not raise the question of the reasonableness of the rates as a defense. Id. at 445-46. The Court felt that such a limitation was unquestionably valid and went on to say: "As we have pointed out such a requirement is objectionable only if by statutory command or in operation it will deny, to those charged with violations, an adequate opportunity to be heard on the question of validity. And, as we have seen, petitioners fail to show that such is the necessary effect of the present statute, or that if so applied as to deprive them of an adequate opportunity to establish the invalidity of a regulation there would not be adequate means of securing appropriate judicial relief in the course either of the statutory proceeding or of the criminal trial." Id.
156 The Court held the withdrawal of jurisdiction unconstitutional. The rationale underlying Klein is not clear. The holding is frequently interpreted to be that Congress cannot "prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department" in pending cases. 1 0 ' Such a view cannot easily be reconciled with the well-established principle that appellate courts are obliged to follow changes in the law enacted during the pendency of an appeal, 162 a principle which would seem to apply with full force to an otherwise valid jurisdictional limitation.'1 3 There is also language in the opinion suggesting that a crucial aspect of the case was the fact that the United States was a party and that it is particularly offensive for a litigant to prescribe a rule of decision for its own case.' 0 4 Yet in many instances the doctrine of sovereign immunity allows the United States to decide whether it will be subject to suit at all. Klein's was just such a case because he based his cause of action on an act of Congress. More to the point, on at least one occasion the Court has upheld Congress' repeal of a statute authorizing an action against the United States after the case had been decided by the Court of Claims and while an appeal to the Supreme Court was pending. the Executive's power to pardon. 16 6 In any event, the Court did find a jurisdictional statute unconstitutional and that alone demonstrates that such laws are subject to constitutional limitation.°7 Thus, it is clear that jurisdictional statutes are subject to constitutional limitations. This, in turn, provides a basis for measuring such statutes in terms of their substantive impact-the procedure followed in Yakius and Battaglia. When their effect is to abrogate constitutional rights, they are no more valid than any other statute violating the Constitution.
The corollary of the foregoing is that Congress has unfettered power to enact jurisdictional laws that accomplish what it could have accomplished by means of a substantive rule; that is, it may enact any jurisdictional statute that does not prevent vindication of a constitutional right. In cases in which Congress can constitutionally prescribe a rule of decision, no federal right that could be vindicated under a constitutional claim can be excluded from the federal courts by the withdrawal of jurisdiction. 108 In short, Congress can withdraw 166. 80 U.S. at 147. See BATOR, supra note 11, at 315; Note, supra note 12, at 1557; U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2. This is the only specific ground of decision mentioned by Professor Fairman. C. FAIRMAN, 6 HISTORY OF THE SUIREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 845 (1971).
Bator et al. note another flaw found by the Court. "[I]n forbidding the court 'to give the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence should have' and directing the court 'to give it an effect precisely contrary,' 'Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power 167. Note, supra note 12, at 1557, states that Klein merely "suggests" such a conclusion. An actual holding of unconstitutionality appears to be more than a suggestion. In light of the ambiguities surrounding the Court's opinion already noted in the text, however, a cautious reading of the case is appropriate. But cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443 (1944) (Congress' jurisdictional power is "subject to other constitutional limitations.').
168. Congress' power to waive jurisdiction of parties who have obtained it collusively is another instance where no constitutional right is sacrificed by a jurisdictional limitation. No federal interest is lost when jurisdiction is not extended to parties who have, in their exuberance to obtain a federal forum, exceeded the spirit of the Constitution's jurisdictional grant.
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850), one of the early cases to allow a restriction of federal jurisdiction, upheld a statute that deprived the old circuit courts of jurisdiction to hear "any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the contents, if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange." 49 U.S. at 441. The statute was designed to prevent collusive federal suits. BATOR, supra note 11, at 34. Perhaps it should have been construed to apply only where collusion was found (It was not. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 131, at 39, 918), but it has since been redrafted to apply only in proven cases of collusion. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970) .
Although on its facts a state court judgment in Sheldon would not have been reviewable in the Supreme Court, BATOR The above explains why the Norris-LaGuardia Act 170 is valid. That Act severely restricts the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issue injunctions or temporary restraining orders in labor disputes. It therefore limits the remedies available to an aggrieved party. 171 All other state and federal remedies, however, remain available. As long as an injunction is not constitutionally required, 72 Congress may deprive a federal court of jurisdiction to issue it. In those labor cases where the Constitution may compel injunctive relief, the NorrisLaGuardia Act probably permits it.173 The Norris-LaGuardia Act can thus be sustained because what Congress accomplished with a jurisdictional statute could permissibly have been accomplished with a substantive rule. That is, Congress could have declared that the circumstances enumerated in the injunction clause must be found to prevail before a party would have a right to an injunction in a labor dispute. Such a law would have had the same effect as the rule denying federal courts jurisdiction to do otherwise. Such a jurisdictional restriction does not deprive anyone of a federal "right" because Congress could have restricted the remedy by substantive regulation.
Congress phrased the Norris-LaGuardia Act in jurisdictional terms
Court's docket seems to have outgrown the capacities of nine men around 1870. Id. At the time of Sheldon, therefore, lower courts with broad jurisdiction may not have been necessary to ensure vindication of all federal rights. My thesis does suggest that from the time the Supreme Court's docket became unmanageable until the time federal question jurisdiction was granted to the lower federal courts, the system was unconstitutional. This was, however, a brief period, if it existed at all. For at about the time the Court's docket became too large for it to handle, Congress gave the lower courts a broad federal question jurisdictional grant. 173. Section 7 of the Act allows a court after factfinding to issue injunctions if (1) unlawful acts have been threatened, will be or have been committed and will continue; (2) substantial and irreparable injury will result; (3) greater injury will result to complainant by denial of relief than to defendants by granting; (4) there is no adequate remedy at law; and (5) the public officers charged with protecting complainants are unwilling or unable to do so. 29 U.S.C. §107 (1970) . It is my view that this provision probably covers all cases in which an injunction may be constitutionally compelled. For instances where injunctions have been allowed, see BATOR, supra note 11, at 317 n.5.
to avoid an apparent conflict with earlier Supreme Court cases. In Truax v. Corrigan 7 4 the Supreme Court struck down, as a denial of due process, a state statute limiting employers' remedies in a fashion similar to the limitation in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Because it is highly unlikely that Truax would be decided the same way today, 17 5 there is little current constitutional difficulty with the NorrisLaGuardia Act. Its restriction on jurisdiction does not deny anyone an otherwise obtainable constitutional right.
The decision that upheld the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co.,' 70 contains some broad dicta' 7 " with respect to the authority of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts. Although Lauf is not a great problem today because the substantive rules of the Norris-LaGuardia Act are clearly constitutional, it can be explained. Laufs holding, as opposed to its broad dicta, would present no problem if, at the time it was decided, Truax was already discredited, for then the Norris-LaGuardia Act would merely have the effect of accomplishing through jurisdiction what Congress could do through substantive rulemaking. By the time Lauf was decided, Truax was already in peril; substantive due process, the approach employed in Truax, saw its demise the year before. 17 Therefore, although the Lauf court did not have to reach the substantive issue of the validity of the district court injunction because it upheld the withdrawal of jurisdiction, the Court would have upheld as well a substantive rule having the same effect as withdrawal of jurisdiction.
Congress' ability to limit federal court jurisdiction is in part an outgrowth of its general lawmaking power as set forth in Article I of the Constitution. This power, under steady expansion since McCulloch v. Maryland, 70 enables Congress to create, refine, and repeal an enormous array of federal rights. Congress' authority to cur-tail these nonconstitutional rights extends to the courthouse steps. Congress' authority to curtail constitutional rights does not. Congress' broad power over the availability of judicial relief for nonconstitutional claims gives it room to promote efficiency without endangering federal court availability for constitutional rights.' 8 0 In addition to authorizing total exclusion of many cases, it permits Congress to relegate many nonconstitutional claims to administrative courts in lieu of full-fledged Article III tribunals.' 8 '
The result of the foregoing is to strike a middle ground between the extremes of a complete absence of lower federal court jurisdiction and complete vesting of the federal constitutional jurisdictional grant. The extremes can be rejected on practical 8 2 as well as constitutional grounds. Important and difficult questions arise in attempting to stake out a rational middle ground that is consistent with modern conditions and with the Article III grant of jurisdiction. In seeking a solution difficult lines have to be drawn. The true substantive impact of a jurisdictional statute may not always be apparent. The line between efficiency motivated and substantive jurisdictional statutes may not always be clear. Difficult distinctions are of course not peculiar to the problem at hand. Some consolation may also be had from the severe difficulties that would necessarily follow from embracing an opposite view. If Congress may single out a class of cases for exclusion from lower federal courts because of disagreement with judicial results, there is no principled way to brake this power short of permitting removal of all constitutional issues from those courts.
III. Remedies and Busing
Yakus and other cases indicate that Congress must provide remedies for protecting rights. 8 3 The power to regulate remedies, like the power to regulate jurisdiction, is sometimes translatable into a power to regulate substantive rights. 8 4 Statutes that control jurisdiction to issue remedies can thus affect substantive rights. They are, therefore, subject to the same restrictions as jurisdictional statutes, which leads to the following conclusions analogous to those reached with respect to jurisdictional statutes: (1) Congress cannot withdraw 183. See pp. 531-32 infra. 184. See Hill, supra note 14. As the discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act showed, the line between "jurisdiction" and "jurisdiction to issue remedies" is unclear.
jurisdiction to issue any constitutionally required remedy; 18 a and (2) Congress can withdraw jurisdiction to issue any remedy not so required.
The school busing issue can be used to illustrate the permissible breadth of congressional jurisdictional control over district court remedies. If busing is a constitutionally required remedy in a particular case,"' then removal of jurisdiction to issue a busing order is clearly unconstitutional. Were it not, Congress, under the pretense of regulating remedies, could achieve substantive results otherwise beyond its power. That state courts can hear busing requests subject to Supreme Court review is no substitute; Supreme Court review is too infrequent to guarantee vindication of federal rights.
If a particular remedy is not constitutionally required, different considerations control. Providing particular remedies when no single remedy is constitutionally necessary is not essential for the proper conduct of the business of the federal judiciary. As long as the federal rights involved in a case can be adequately vindicated in some manner, Congress may adjust the available remedies with impunity. 8 7
The cases support Congress' power to choose among remedies. In the area of taxation, the Court had upheld provisions requiring protesting taxpayers to pay taxes first and litigate later, 88 forbidding injunctions against collection of taxes,' 8 9 and requiring taxpayers to contest assessments before, rather than after, payment. 90 1971) . Part III of the Swann decision confronts the question of remedies and implies that in certain circumstances a remedy or remedies might be constitutionally required. "Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies .....
As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." Id. at 15-16. The school authorities argued that "the equity powers of federal district courts have been limited by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" which reads in pertinent part:
Nothing herein shall empower an official or court of the United States to issue any order seeking to achieve racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one school to another or one school district to another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the court to insure compliance with constitutional standards. Id. at 16-17. The Court interpreted this section to mean not that Congress was attempting to curtail existing equitable remedies, but that it wanted the courts to understand that it was not creating new remedies to attack de facto segregation. Id.
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Conclusion
The inability of the Supreme Court to do justice in every case within the Article III grant of jurisdiction has broad implications. It means that Congress cannot deny lower federal courts jurisdiction on the ground that Supreme Court review of state court decisions provides an adequate mechanism for vindicating federal rights. It also means that jurisdictional statutes which foreclose only lower federal court jurisdiction and which have substantive impact must be subjected to constitutional scrutiny. 93 The conclusion is also inescapable that Congress cannot withdraw federal jurisdiction to hear cases in which constitutional rights are at stake;' 94 nor can Congress Yerger can perhaps be seen as lending substantial weight to the thesis advanced here. In Yerger the Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Chase, relied on a portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 not repealed by the statute withdrawing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases (upheld in McCardle) to assert jurisdiction to issue its own writ of habeas corpus. The Circuit Court for Mississippi had refused to issue the writ. If Chief Justice Chase's opinion is to be reconciled with his opinion in McCardle, where he also wrote for the majority, it must be read very narrowly. While it is true that McCardle was decided on the basis of the exceptions clause, it is also true that in Yerger the Court was in fact serving as an appellate court for the order denying the writ. At one point, Chief Justice Chase wrote, "They [the words of the act] affected only appeals and appellate jurisdiction authorized by that act. They do not purport to touch the appellate jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution, or to except from it any cases not excepted by the act of 1789." Id. at 105.
The essence of any narrow reading of Yerger must be that the Constitution explicitly grants the courts the right to issue a writ of habeas corpus. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. Even read in this light, the Yerger case puts a gloss on Article III, § 2, cl. 2, that generally supports the thesis advanced here.
193. Contrast with the conclusion reached here the statement: Habeas corpus aside, I'd hesitate to say that Congress couldn't effect an unconstitutional withdrawal of jurisdiction-that is, a withdrawal to effectuate unconstitutional purposes-if it really wanted to. Hart, supra note 102, at 1398-99. One interesting side-effect of this statement, if accepted, would be that, in effect, the Congress without the concurrence of the states could repeal the Tenth Amendment by a jurisdictional statute.
194. The conclusion that federal courts must be available to vindicate constitutional rights has important implications for federal habeas law. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), the two landmarks in the modern expansion of federal habeas corpus, the Court proceeded by construing the federal habeas statutes and by ascertaining the historical scope of the Great Writ. Some have argued that it misconstrued those statutes, see BATOR, supra note 11, at 1467 n.3; Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Cu1. L. REv. 31 (1965) , and that it misread the Writ's history. See Oaks, Legal History in withdraw jurisdiction to grant constitutionally required remedies.
Lest anyone misinterpret the argument advanced here, let me add one caveat that has been noted earlier. It is clear from the text of the Constitution and the Convention's deliberations that no single form of lower court system is mandated. 19 ; It may well suffice to provide an appeal to a subordinate federal court from state courts, 10 6 as long as such forums are generally available.
The lower federal courts are thus indispensable if the judiciary is to be a co-equal branch and if the "judicial Power of the United States"' 9 7 is to remain the power to protect rights guaranteed by the Constitution and its Amendments. Abolition of the lower federal courts is no longer constitutionally permissible; with the demise of the assumption that they may be abolished it must necessarily follow that the jurisdiction of these courts is not a matter solely within the discretion of Congress.' 9 8 Fay and Brown can be placed on alternative and more permanent footing by regarding federal habeas corpus for state prisoners not as a matter of statutory or historical interpretation, but merely as one necessary technique for implementing the national judiciary's role as vindicator of individual rights in each case within its jurisdiction. This is not to say that federal habeas is the only possible means of satisfying this role. Absent alternatives, widespread federal habeas for state prisoners may well be constitutionally mandated. Each state applicant need not be afforded a full-blown federal hearing. Reliance on the record of the state proceedings is not only appropriate, but probably necessary to avoid undue burdens on the lower courts. See LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690 (1973); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) .
195. The inadvisability of fixing in the Constitution the precise structure of the federal system's lower echelons was noted long ago. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 39, at 517 (Pendleton at Virginia deliberations).
196. "I perceive at present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the State courts to the subordinate national tribunals; and many advantages attending the power of doing it may be imagined. 197. U.S. CoNsT-. art. III, § 1. 198. Two arguments which seemingly stress "political" considerations and which have not hitherto received attention in this article support giving Congress broad power to withdraw cases from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The first of these suggests that the "legitimacy" of judicial review is "enormously buttressed" by allowing Congress broad, and substantive, jurisdictional power. BATOR, supra note 11, at 364. The second argument is that Congress, which now needs the courts to enforce and interpret its statutes, would not in fact severely limit lower federal court jurisdiction. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLum. L. REV. 1001, 1006-07 (1965) .
With respect to the first argument, it seems to me that endangering the liberties of all of us is an excessively high price to pay for some unknown amount of legitimation of judicial review, a phenomenon not seriously under attack in this country. It would be small consolation to a black forced to use segregated public facilities because of a withdrawal of federal jurisdiction to know that his loss has in some mystical way strengthened the judiciary's authority to hold federal laws unconstitutional.
As for the second argument, it is comforting to think that, because of the exigencies of the day, it is unlikely that jurisdictional cutbacks will occur. The threat, however, is more real than Professor Wechsler leads us to believe, especially as the recent controversy about limiting federal court authority to issue busing orders amply illustrates.
